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That alternative  objective  summary  measures  of outward ori-
entation  produce  entirely  different  country  rankings  is probably
not an astounding  revelation. Trade  regulations  and  barriers  are
generally  complex  legally  and even  more  opaque  in their actual
administration.  The hope that any reasonably  straightforward
summary  measure  could produce  a "correct"  ranking  of coun-
tries  has always  been  treated  skeptically  and  - disappointingly
-rightly  so.
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Pritchett tries to move debate on the empirical  that one (but only one) of the measures best
cross-country relationship between trade policy  captures outward orientation cannot be rejected.
and economic performance back one step by
asking the question.  Can the economists'  He concludes that no reliable, robust esti-
intuitive notion of outwardly oriented policy be  mate of the impact of general outward orienta-
captured empirically?  Different authors have  tion on economic performance (economic
used different measures as proxies for trade  growth or expert performance) is likely to be
policy stances and generally have come to  possible from cross-country data. This is not to
similar conclusions:  that outwardly oriented  say that particular variables, such as the price
countries perform better.  distortion variable, won't perform well (have a
high t-statistic) in explaining cross-country
Pritchett examines the relationship between  variation in economic performance.  But infer-
four types of empirical measures of outward  ring that that type of empirical result is due to the
orientation across countries:  effects of an outward-oriented policy stance
requires additional evidence establishing a link
* Share of trade (or imports) in GDP, adjusted  between the measure and policies.
for the countries' structural characteristics or  Large changes in the NTB coverage ratio rn
factor endowments.  a particular country are more likely to indicate a
movement  toward  import  liberalization  than * T he  average  tariff  and coverage  ratio  of  mvmn  oadipi  ieaiaind nontheiff  bavrierage  NTariffBanscoveragrat  similar differences between countries at a point
in time, but those relying on the NTB coverage
*  Measures of the deviation of countries'  ratio as the key indicator of liberalization must
actual trade pattem from the pattem predicted  recognize the lack of supporting evidence lnking
from a model of resource-based comparative  the coverage ratio to observable trade outcomes.
advantage.  The administrative and legal nature of NTBs
*  A measure of real price distortions.  makes them an easily monitorable indicator on
which to base conditionality in liberalization
programs, but the generally discretionary nature
Pritchett finds that these promising candi-  of NTB implementation must be recognized, so
dates for measuring outward orientation are  that the removal of a particular type of legal
nearly completely unrelated in a cross-country  restriction not be considered synonymous with
data set.  He concludes that he cannot glowingly  increased outward orientation.
recommend one measure over another. Nor can
any of the candidates be rejected outright. The  Data and programs are available from the
absence of correlation among them he skepti-  author.
cally interprets as an indictment of each.  But
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MEASURING  OUTWARD-ORIENTATION  IN LDCS:
CAN  IT BE DONE?
The pressure for trade reform as an integral component of adjustment
programs has intensified the ongoing debate about the benefits of trade
liberalization of trade regimes in the less developed countries (LDCs)
(Havrylyshyn 1990, Rodrik 1990).  This heightened interest has in turn
generated continued empirical study of the relationship between economic
performance and trade policy orientation.  One branch of this overall policy-
performance literature uses cross-country regressions relating economic
performance and a measure of policy "outward orientation" or "openness"  to
investigate this relationship.  This paper attempts to move the debate on the
empirical cross-country relationship between trade policy and economic
performance backwards one step by asking the question, can the economists'
intuitive notion of policy outward-orientation be captured empirically?
Different authors have used different measures to proxy for trade policy
stance (Edwards 1989, Dollar 1990, Balassa 1985) and generally have come to
similar conclusions; namely that outward oriented countries perform better.
If these different proxies for policy stance were strongly correlated this
would enhance our confidence that some significant, well-understood aspect of
country policy is captured by these variables representing "outward-
orientation."  This paper examines cross-country data for a number of
variables that can plausibly claim to be a summary measure of outward
1  A separate but related literature  relates  exports, or export performance,
and economic growth (Feder  1983, Tyler 1983, Jung and Marshall 1985).  However,
as these studies address policy orientation at best indirectly they will not be
discussed.3
orientation.  The empirical evidence presented below is easily summarized:
the alternative objective2 measures of outward orientation examined are
completely uncorrelated across countries.  This result has serious
implications for empirical research that attempts to assess the effects of
liberalization on economic performance using comparisons across countries and
highlights the difficulties of interpretation in these type of empirical
studies.
This paper is divided into four sections.  The first reviews broadly and
briefly some principles of the measurement of trade barriers.  The second
section examines the relationship between four types of empirical measures of
outward orientation across countries.  These are a) the share of trade (or
imports) in GDP, adjusted for country structural characteristics or factors
endowments, b) the average tariff and coverage ratio of non-tariff barriers
(NTBs),  c) measures of the deviation of countries' actual trade pattern from
the pattern predicted from a model of resource based comparative advantage,
and d) a measure of real price distortions.  The third section discusses the
interpretation and implications  of the lack of association between the various
measures, and the fourth concludes.
I.  Measurina outward orientation in LDCs
The loes developed countries (LDCs)  tend to deploy a host of tariff and
non-tariff barriers to imports and generally pursue policies that bias
incentives against exports.  Attempting a summary measure of the total impact
of these barriers for a single country is a formidable project, and attempting
to construct such a measure that would be comparable across countries, even
2 The World Development Report  1987, developed a  subjective, discrete,
classification of countries by outward orientation that will not be treated.4
more foreboding.  Nevertheless, given the importance of the subject, measures
of various kinds have been proposed.
As outlined in Baldwin (1989)  there are two types of measures of trade
barriers: outcome and incidence.  Outcome based measures assess the deviation
of the observed outcome from the outcome without the trade barriers.  Outcome
measures are either price based (such  as effective rates of protection or
assistance) or trade flow based.  Incidence based measures on the other hand
count the frequency of occurrences of the various types of non-tariff
barriers.
Both incidence and outcome measures have limitations.  Incidence, or
frequency, measures of NTBs generally cannot assees the severity of the
distortion imposed.  Quantity, or trade flow, outcome measures are
particularly sensitive to construction of the counter-factual, what would have
happened in the absence of the trade barrier, which is often difficult to
assess.  Price outcome measures, while feasible for particular products, are
extraordinarily difficult to aggregate into an economy wide summary measure.
outward orientation is a multi-dimensional concept.  One can
conceptually dlstinguish openness from liberality.  Trade liberality is the
absence of government induced distortions in the flow and pattern of
international trade.  Liberality is not synonymous with outward orientation as
countries can be outward oriented while the government plays a large role in
determining economic incentives.  Korea is o2ten used as an oxample of an
illiberal, yet outward oriented country.  Similarly, openness is not
synonymous with outward orientation as a country could achieve a high ratio of
trade to GDP with highly interventionist  policies that lead to a highly
distorted pattern of trade.  While intuition suggests -- hat outward oriented5
countries will tend to be simultaneously more open and more liberal, the
actual relationships amongst the various components of outward orientation is
an empirical question.
The next section examines six outward orientation measures:  two trade
flow based measures of openness, a frequency indicator of NTBs, the average
tariff level, an outcome based price distortion measure, and a trade flow
distortion index.
II.  Comparison of Alternative Outward Orientation Measures
Empirical research into the effects of outward orientation on economic
performance has generally not disentangled liberality and openness.  This
section examines the empirical relation between measures of openness and
liberality, first by comparing two openness measures to each of three
liberality maeasures,  and secondly by examining the internal coherence of the
three liberality indices is analyzed.
one difficulty in comparisons of outward orientation is that no measure
has ever been proposed that is comparable both across countries and over time.
Each of the cross-country n.easures  examined here was constructed to compare
countries during a different time period.  However, this does not render
comparisons uninteresting for two reasons.  First, the measures cover roughly
the same period (mid-1980s).  Secondly, cross-country measures can be linked
to economic performance over time only if the pattern across countries is
relatively stable.
A) Trade flow based measures of openness vs. liberality
Perhaps the most obvious indicator of outward orientation is the ratio
of trade to total output.  Intuitively, highly protectionist policies and a
large anti-export bias tend to reduce the fraction of economic activity that6
is internationally traded.  The obvious diff.culty with openness as an outward
orientation measure is that trade intensity varies across countries for
reasons having nothing to do with policy and a measure of policy openness must
adjust for these factors.  This adjustment has been done in two ways; using
structural features of the economy, or correcting for differences in factor
endowments across countries.
A straightforward policy openness indicator is the magnitude of trade
flows relative to GDP, corrected for certain "structural" characteristics of
the Chenery-Syrquin (1975, 1988) type such as level of per capita GDP, size
(both area and population), transport costs and obvious resource endowment
characteristics.  This measure, which I call "structure adjusted trade
intensity" has been used as an outward orientation measure by Balassa (1985),
among others.
Equation 1 is the basic equation that relates trade intensity and
structural characteristics:
(1)  Trade Intensity =  ao + aI *  pop'l + a2 area + a3 CIF/FOB  +  a 4 Gut  per
capita + aE (GDP  per capita)^2 + a.  oil dummy
The residuals from equation 1 can be taken as measure of outward orientation,
as the residuals indicate  the amount by which a countries openness exceeds or
falls short of that expected of a country of its type3. The goodness of fit
for the trade intensity regressions (R2 of .344 for overall trade) is not bad
3  This  procedure  is  slightly incorrect as  ideally the  country wnose
openness  is being  measured  should  be  excluded  from the  estimation  of  the
parameters.  If a separate regression is estimated excluding each country to
calculate  its deviation  (equivalent to estimating  a dummy  for each  country
individually) the simple (rank) correlation is .95 (.99).  The only countries
for  which the ranking is altered are those that are outliers in the independent
variables.  Canada  (area), India (population),  and Malawi  (CIF/FOB  ratio) are
the only countries whose openness ranking changes by more than 5 places.7
for crosu country regressions of this type (full  regression results are in
Appendix 1).  All variables were significant (at  the 10% level) except for the
CIF/FOB ratio4 and population.  The regressions give the Asual  results that
trade intensity increases at a decreasing rate in GDP per capita (an inverse
U), declines with area and increases with population.  For more direct
comparisor with the NTB incidence and trade distortions measures, adjusted
trade penetration ratios are computed for total trade (exports  plus imports),
total imports5, and various import-subcategories.
The empirical importance of adjusting the simple ratio of trade to GDP
to derive an outward orientation measure depends on the resultant changes in
the countries' rankings by openness.  Table 1 compares the correlation of the
unadjusted and structure adjusted trade intensity ratios, for 1982 and 19856.
While the simple correlation within years is generally high (above .8), the
rank correlation is relatively low.  The rank correlation for total trade in
1982 (1985)  was .39 (.66)  which indicates that the adjustment for structural
factors altered the rankings substantially.  The difference in the simple and
rank correlations suggests that the rankings of the most open countries are
not much affected while the rankings for many countries in the middle of the
4  Balassa and Noland (1988) find that if  the CIF/FOB ratio is adjusted
for  the  ratio  of  primary  to  manufactured  goods  in  total  trade  is  performs  quite
well  in  an  openness  regression  for  industrial  countries.  However,  Dunn  (1990)
finds that although the CIF/FOB ratio is significant in gravity equations only
for the industrial countries, not for the LDCs.
5  The correlation between trade intensity (exports  plus imports/GDP) and
import  penetration  is  quite  high.  The  simple  (rank)  correlation  before
adjustment is .90 (.83),  while after adjustment the correlttions are .88 (.82).
6  Data from two different years are used to facilitate comparisons with
the other measures discussed below.8
distribution are re-ordered 7. However the importance of adjustment for
"structural" factors is less important for LDCU than the industrial countries.
For the non-oil LDCs the simple (rank) correlations of  adjusted and unadjusted
trade intensity in 1985  were .902 (.788).  Table A.1 of the date appendix
displays the actual and adjusted trade intensity ratios for t.he  LDCU and DCI
in 1985, sorted from most to least open.
Table 1:  Cros.  country  correlation  of  unadjusted  and  "structure
adjusted" trade intensity ratios in 1982 and 1985.
1982  1985
simple  rank  simple  rank
total  0.88  0.39  0.83  0.66
manufacturing  0.81  0.46  0.78  0.49
agriculture  0.87  0.66  0.87  0.67
resources  0.91  0.40  0.82  0.67
A major potential weakness of the structure adjusted trade intensity
ratio is that the adjustment is ad hoc and atheoretic.  A theoretically more
sophisticated openness, or trade intensity, measure has been constructed by
Leamer (1988).  He creates a measure of openness from the estimation of a
Heckscher-Ohlin-Vanek mnodel  of trade flows.  Using dt;.a  from 1982 the model
predicts the net exports for each country for each of the 182 three digit SITC
commodity classes as a function of the country's endowment of capital, land,
labor, oil, coal, minerals the dLstance to its markets and the trade balance.
The openness measure for total trade for a country (and  the three sub-
aggregates, manufacturing, agriculture, and resources) is computed as the sum
7  If  the five countries with the highest  unadjusted trade intensity  ratios
are excluded, the simple correlations  between  the adjusted and  unadjusted ratios
fall from .88  to .37 in 1982 and from .83  to .681 in 19fi.9
of the deviations of the predicted from the actual level of net exports8
across all commodities (see  data appendix for details).  I will call this the
"endowment adjusted trade intensity ratio," or Leamer's openness measure.  The
structure and endowment adjusted measures of trade openness will be compared
to the other outward orientation measures, however, first, t.ae  impact of the
adjustment of the raw trade intensity ratios itself will be assessed.
The impact on the openness ranking of countries of the adjustment for
"structure" versus the "endowment" adjustment is quite different.  Tabla 2
shows the correlations of Leamer's openness with the unadjusted and structure
adjusted trade intensity ratios.  Disturbingly, Leamer'a openness measure has
a  much higher correlation with the unadjusted than the st:ucture adjusted
trade intensity ratio.  In the overall country sample9 the rank correlation of
Leamer's measure with thei  unadjusted trade share of GDP is .65 compared to .15
with the "structure adjusted" ratio, and the rank correlation of the two
adjusted trade intensity ratios in the LDC sub-sample is only .06.  The
results from table 1 tell us that the adjustment of trade intensity for
structural characteristics matters quite a lot in the openness ordering of
countries.  However, the results in table 2 indicate that another equally
plausible adjustment, for factor endowments, also reorients the rankings, but
in a very different way.  This weak correlation should be kept in mind as
8 Leamer's "intervention" indices  discussed below measure the deviation of
the actual from  predicted trade Pattern,  while the "openness"  index  measures the
deviation of the actual from predicted trade level.
9 The  sample  for comparison is  limited by the  number of  countries in
Leamer's  paper,  although the  larger sample  is used  in  computing the  trade
intensity regressions.  The sample used in the trade intensity regression does
not affect the basic result.10
these  two  upeu1iui3:n L'1.  compared  with  other  outward  orientation
measure.
Table 2:  Corr-elationl  of  Leamer's  (1988)  openness  measure  with
unadjusted and "structure  adjusted"  trade intensity  ratios.
Correlation  Rank Correlation
undacljlisted  adjusted  unadjusted  adjusted
All countries (1X-4)
total  0.75  0.36  0.65  0.15
manufacturing  0.74  0.43  0.63  0.15
agriculture  0.48  0.39  0.40  0.34
resource  0.F6  0.36  0.44  0.29
LDCs  only (lv-2q)
total  0.7/  0.32  0.52  0.06
manufacturing  0.75  0.46  0.39  0.10
agriculture  0.45  0.34  0.37  0.22
resource  0.88  0.37  0.33  0.24
The liberality nmasure  of  outward orientation to be compared to openness
is conctructed  wonm  data on the height of tariff barriers arA frequency of
NTBs for  LDCs 10 This  data  has  been collected from country sources by UNCTAD
(see UNCTAD, 1988 and Erzan, et. al., 1989).  Tariffs and non-tariff barriers
were collected for 89 LDCs at a detailed commodity level (SITC 5-digit).
Weighted average total import chargesl  were computed for total imports and
three sub-aggregates; manufacturing, agriculture, and resources using imports
as weights (see  the data appendix).  The coverage ratio of non-tariff barriers
is the world trade weiqhted percent of tariff code lines covered by various
types of non-tariff barriers (licenses,  quotas, prohibitions) as a percent of
lO Frequency type measures of the incidence of non-tariff barriers for the
industrialized countries (Nogues,  Olechowski, and Winters 1986,  Laird and Yeats
1988) also exist but are not comparable to the LDC data.
11 The variable is referred to as tariffa although it includes all import
charges, such as duties, customs fees, etc.11
all tariff code lines within the aggregate.  Overall measures that affect all
imports, Luch as comprehensive foreign exchange licensing and general import
licensing are also recorded.  The data is for a single year for each
country.12  The data appear to be very carefully constructed to capture as
best as possible the fraction of goods subject to nontariff import constraints
and nothing in this paper should be construed as a criticism of its
calculation or construction.  The UNCTAD data for those countries used in the
analysis is shown in the data appendix tables A.2 and A.3.  The basic features
of the data have been discussed elsewhere (Erzan  et al, 1989) and this paper
is limited to examining the relationship between the NTB coverage ratios and
average tariff charges, and other outward-orientation measures.
While tariffs are often high, the predominant form of import control in
LDCs is the discretionary licensing of imports.  If non-tariff barriers (NTBs)
and tariffs reduce the level of imports and if the NTB coverage ratios and
statutory13 tariff levels capture this effect, then NTB coverage and mean
tariffs should be an empirically important determinants in reducing import
penetration14 ratios.  Table 3 presents the results for just the N4B variable
from cross country regressions of import penetration ratios for each of four
12 The data is a rolling cross section, with each country giving the most
up to date possible.  The actual dates for  each country range from 1985 to early
1988.  Again, this raises the issue of changes over time.
13 The tariffs are the legal levels, not amounts actually collected, which
tends to be substantially lower.
14  Import penetration ratios are used instead of total trade intensity
because  information is available only on barriers to and taxes on  imports.
However, the correlation  between overall import  penetration and trade intensity
in 1985 was  .89, so that  this  is not  likely to  be  an empirically  crucial
difference.  Also,  1985 was  the  latest year that trade  data was  generally
available, while the trade barrier data more up to data.  Again, this is not a
major problem as the cross country correlation over time is quite high.12
aggregates (total  manufactures, agriculture and resource.) on the NTB coverage
ratio, total tariff charges, and the structural determinants of import
penetration used in equation 1 for the 72 LDCs for which data was available.15
Under each aggregate, the first column shows the standardized beta
coefficient,1 6 and the second column the p-level, which is the significance
level of the usual t-test that the coefficient is zero.17 The results for
NTBs are easily summarized (full  regression results are in Appendix 2).  The
estimated impact of NTB coverage on trade intensity in the full sample was
nearly uniformly of the wrong sign, very small18 and always statistically
insignificant.
Figure 1 depicts the relationship between structure-adjusted total
import penetration and the NTB coverage ratio for the full sample.  On the
vertical axis for each country is the structure adjusted trade intensity.  For
instance, Jordan's (JOR)  import penetration is roughly 40 percentage points
higher than the predicted value from the regression.  One would expect that
15  This procedure is  nearly identical  to constructing  an index  of openness
from the residuals of the estimated equation 1 and taking the correlation with
NTBs and tariffs.  Using the regression approach allows separate assessment of
the impact of tariff and non-tariff measures.
16  The standardized  beta scales the regression  beta coefficients such  that
the coefficient tells how many standard  deviations the dependent variable would
change for a one standard deviation change in the independent variable.  This
is reported  rather than  the usual regression coefficients  because  the regression
is in levels, and yet the independent variables are of very different scale.
17 P-levels less than .05 indicate a rejection of the null hypothesis of
no relationship.  The significance levels are reported directly rather than the
usual t statistics themselves to aid in interpretation.  The significance level
tells more clearly how  far the test  is from being able to  reject the null
hypothesis.
18 The ratio of the variables (NTB/penetration)  at the medians are: 1.10,
1.37, 9.67, 7.3 for overall, manufacturing, agriculture and resources.  The
elasticities for the full sample in levels at the medians therefore are: -.047,
.041, .022, -.074, respectively.13
Table  3:  Estimated  impact  of non-tariff  barrier  coverage  on  import
penetration  in a cross  country  regression.
total  manufacturing  agriculture  resource
std.  Sig.  std.  sig.  std.  Big.  std.  sig.
Sample:  b  lvl.  b  lvl.  b  lvl.  b  lvl.
full,  levels  0.058  0.618  0.078  0.506  0.021  0.875  -0.039  0.746
full,  logs  0.034  0.756  0.063  0.558  0.162  0.179  -0.162  0.152
w/o  3 outliers  0.077  0.533  0.022  0.851  0.031  0.819  -0.177  0.145
w/o  10 outliers  0.046  0.663  0.061  0.505  0.045  0.727  -0.122  0.268
nonoil  exporters  -0.047  0.729  -0.024  0.856  0.011  0.940  -0.158  0.240
w/o general  lic.  0.061  0.647  0.073  0.574  0.053  0.728  -0.071  0.619
w/o  FEX  or
general  lic.  0.012  0.926  0.033  0.793  -0.008  0.955  -0.014  0.913
the  countries  with  low NTBs  would  be more  open  and those  with  high  NTBs  less
open,  producing  a general  downward  sloping  relationship.  Visual  inspection
verifies  the  regression  results  that  no clear  relationship  exists.
As cross  country  regressions  are  notoriously  sensitive  to the  influence
of exceptional  observations,  the  robustness  of the  regression  results  were
verified  by dividing  the  overall  sample  of countries  in many  ways19  and
performing  the  same  regression  on these  different  subsets  of  countries.  As
can  be  seen  in rows  3 to  7 of table  3, the  lack  of  a relationship  between
trade  intensity  and  NTB  coverage  is robust  to sample  selection,  for  all  import
aggregates.
19 Besides  the  regressions  in the  table  the  sample  was  divided  by  income,
by NTB coverage  and by import  penetration.  NTB  coverage  was  never  significant.14
Figure  1:  NTB coverage and import penetration
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Leamer's openness measure was regressed on mean tariffs and NTB coverage
ratios for the four aggregates.20 Table 4 presents standardized beta
coefficient and p-levels for NTB coverage and mean tariffs on openness  for
each of the aggregates in the full and an outlier restricted sample.21
Examining the first two rows of table 4 it is evident that the endowment
adjusted openness measure and the NTB coverage ratio are, at best, weakly
20 Note that Leamer's measures deal with net exports, whereas the trade
barriers cover only imports.
21 The outlier restricted sample eliminates the ten percent of the sample
with the largest (absolute value) residuals.  This is done in a purely ad hoc
manner  to  assess  the  importance of  "unusual" countries  in  determining  the
results.  In  the  overall  imports  regression  the  countries  excluded  were:
Singapore, Trinidad and Tobago, and Yugoslavia.15
Table 4  Relationship of Non-tariff barriers and  mean total import charges
to Leamer's (1988)  openness measure.
Sample:  total  manufacturing  agriculture  resource
Non-tariff
std.  sig.  std.  sig.  std.  sig.  std.  sig.
b  lvl.  b  lvl.  b  lvl.  b  lvl.
full  -0.13  0.53  -0.09  0.67  -0.31  0.14  -0.19  0.38
restricted  -0.17  0.41  -0.00  1.00  -0.31  0.17  -0.08  0.69
Tariffs
full  -0.53  0.01**  -0.41  0.08*  -0.25  0.21  -0.28  0.20
restricted  -0.51  0.02**  -0.47  0.05*  -0.16  0.46  -0.52  0.02**
**  - significant at the 5% level
*  - significant at the 10% level
correlated.  While the coefficients on NTB coverage at least have the expected
sign they are small and nowhere near significant for total, manufacturing or
resources trade.  Only agriculture is  there a hint of a relationship.  Figure
2 displays the plot between NTB coverage and the Leamer's HOV based openness
measure.  Once again, the regression results and their robustness are visually
apparent.  No relationship exists between NTB coverage and openness measures
based either on adjusted import penetration ratios or on a more sophisticated
trade intensity which adjusts for factor endowments.
While NTB coverage is completely unrelated to either openness measure,
the bottom two rows of table 4 report the coefficients of mean tariffs on
Leamer's openness measure.  Tariff levels have a strong impact on openness
overall trade, and manufactures.  Table 5 reports the coefficients on mean
tariffs from the structural import penetration regressions, which also provide
some evidence that the level of legal tariff charges does have an impact on
import penetration levels, especially with overall imports and manufactures.16
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Given  the  usual  view  that  tariff  protection  is  not  serious  in  LDCe  relative  to
NTBo and  that legal  tariffs  are  often  a poor  proxy  for  actual  import  charges
the correlation  of tariffs  with openness  is  quite  surprising.
Another  potential  outward  orientation  measure  is a  price  outcome  based
liberality  measure  which  uses  the  price  comparisons  undertaken  as part  of the
Summers  and  Heston  research  into  international  comparisons  of real  national
product  (ICP). The  ICP  project  used surveys  to measure  the  prices  of a basket
of goods  in  a large  number  of countries. These  detailed  price  comparisons
were  then  uied to construct  a purchasing  power  parity  (PPP)  exchange  rate  used
to convert  local  currency  values  into  internationally  comparable  levels. The
PPP  exchange  rate  divided  by the  official  exchange  rate  produces  an17
Table  5:  Estimated  impact  of  average  total  import  charges  on  import
penetration in cross-country regression.
overall  manufacturing  agriculture  resource
std.  sig.  std.  sig.  std.  sig.  std.  sig.
Sample:  b  lvl.  b  lvl.  b  lvl.  b  lvl.
full, levels  -0.290  0.053*  -0.284  0.066*  -0.212 0.170  -0.197 0.141
full, logs  -0.104  0.348  -0.173  0.125  -0.095 0.464  0.010 0.927
w/o 3 outliers  -0.257  0.106  -0.312  0.043** -0.281 0.070* -0.077 0.566
w/o 10 outliers -0.378  0.007** -0.414  0.001** -0.244 0.108  -0.278 0.034**
nonoil
exporters  -0.271  0.117  -0.309  0.081*  -0.231 0.188  -0.122 0.421
w/o general
licenses  -0.255  0.150  -0.243  0.162  -0.111 0.552  -0.148 0.391
w/o FEX or
general lic.  -0.175  0.183  -0.138  0.302  -0.134 0.335  -0.157 0.210
**  (*! - significant at the 5 (10)% level.
internationally comparable index of price levels.  If one assumes that trade
restrictions result in a higher price level, all else equal, then the inverse
of the price level22 could be used as an outward orientation index.  The data
and country rankings by this approach are in the data appendix, table A.5.
Table 6 present. the results from the regression of overall trade on the
usual variables from equation 1, plus this price based measure of outward
orientation for a number of different country sub-samples. 23 The general
statistical insignificance and changes in sign of the price distortion
coefficient indicate that this outward orientation measure is also empirically
unrelated to trade intensity.  In the regression for LDCs an increase in the
price level actually increases openness, although this result, like the
others, is statistically insignificant.  Figure 3 is a graph of structure
22 Corrected for the systematic impact of level of per capita GDP.
23  From the time series price data a measure of price variability was also
constructed which was also included in the regression, with some success.18
adjuuted  trade  intensity  and
Table 6:  Effect  of  price  distortion
the price distortion  variable in trade intensity
equations.
measure.  It is difficult to Sample  Std  beta  Big level
discern any pattern or
All.  -0.062  0.572
relation.  LDCu only  0.006  0.959
w/o outliers  0.Q43  0.695
w/o Africa  0.061  0.692
w/o HKG, SGP, IND  -0.014  0.916
Non-oil LDCs  -0.064  0.605
Leamer's openness
simple  rank
ALL  -.132  -.003
LDCs  -.014  -.051
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Price  cistortion19
Table 7 presents the ten most and least outward oriented of 72 LDCs, as
ranked by openness or price distortion.  In the upper left quadrant are the
ten least price distorted countries, of these seven had adjusted trade
intensity below the median, and two (Nepal  and Colombia) were among the ten
least open. Similarly, of the top ten most outward oriented countries by trade
intensity, four (Congo,  Jamaica, Gambia, and Togo) were in the bottom third by
the distortion measure.
Table 7:  Comparisons  of  the  ten most  and  least outward  oriented
countries  of  72  LDCs,  ranked  by  openness  and  price
distortion.
Ten least price distorted  Ten most open
Ranks by:  Ranks by:
Dist.  Openness  Openness  Dist.
Sri Lanka  1  20  Guyana  1  38
Hong Kong  2  2  Hong Kong  2  2
Bangladesh  3  57  Congo  3  65
Mexico  4  56  Jamaica  4  50
Nepal  5  63  Malaysia  5  12
Thailand  6  44  Gambia  6  54
Pakistan  7  50  Papua New Guinea  7  28
Syria  8  43  Togo  8  51
Malta  9  10  Jordan  9  36
Colombia  10  71  Malta  10  9
Ten most price distorted  Ten least open
Cameroon  63  17  Nepal  63  5
Algeria  64  33  Paraguay  64  52
Congo  65  3  Yemen  65  47
Sierra Leone  66  58  Rwanda  66  59
Zaire  67  15  Oman  67  45
Niger  68  46  Uruguay  68  17
Zambia  69  28  Guatemala  69  30
Tanzania  70  62  Burkina Faso  70  46
Ghana  71  51  Colombia  71  10
Nigeria  72  31  Iran  72  25
The bottom half of table 6 shows the correlation between Leamer's trade
intensity measure and price distortions.  While the correlation is negative
as expected (higher price distortion associated with less openness) the20
relationship is very weak and not statistically significant.  As with NTB
coverage, outward orientation measured using the unexplained deviations of
country's price levels produces rankings completely unrelated to openness
measured by either adjusted trade intensity ranking.
The two adjusted openness measures can also be compared to a measure of
trade distortion constructed by Leamer, trade intervention indices.  The
difficulties of constructing an adequate measure of trade liberality based on
the incidence of legal restrictions has led some to measure liberality in
terms of actual trade flows.24 E. Leamer's (1988)  cross section estimation
the HOV model provides measures of trade distortion for each country which
compare the actual trade pattern to that predicted from the HOV factor
endowment model of comparative advantage.  Leamer uses the deviations of the
pattern of trade from the predicted pattern to form an "intervention" index25
for total trade as well as marufacturing, agricultural and resource aggregates
(see  the data appendix).  Thik "intervention" index is a trade flow outcome
based measure of trade liberality.  As the appropriate normalization of the
residuals (as countries with large trade would tend to have large absolute
deviations) is not clear, Leamer constructed three separate indices from
intervention the residuals from the estimated HOV trade model, %Ting different
weights of the same residuals.  Two measures were calculated from the sum of
24 A body of literature has grown up around the question of whether Japan
is or is not more protectionist than other nations.  Japan scores relatively
low by the incidence measures, but has very low trade intensity.  Saxonhouse
(1985) argues that for Japan, a low import penetration ratio for manufactures
simply indicates a  comparative advantage in  production  of manufactures.  Balassa
and  Noland  (1988), on  the other  hand,  find Japan  very  closed,  even  after
accounting for endowments.
25  This intervention index  differs from  the adjusted  trade intensity  in  that
both  positive  and  negative  deviations of  actual  trade  from  the  prediction
increase the intervention indices.21
the absolute value of the residuals, scaling the total either by predicted
trade or GDP.  A third measure was the country R2 (the  proportiot.  of the
countries trade pattern predicted by the model) 26. Higher levels of the trade
intervention indices indicate greater distortions.  Table 7 shows the results
of adding these intervention indices to the basic trade intensity equation.
If openness were associated with lower trade intervention then the sign of the
coefficients should be negative.  The only results of unambiguous statistical
significance are those of the GDP weighted intervention index, which is
perversely signed.  The sign and significance of the intervention index scaled
by predicted trade depend critically on the particular sample.  The R-squared
intervention measure is consistently of the expected sign, but never
statistically significant.
Table 8:  Impact of Leamer's intervention indices on overall trade
intensity.
Intervention indices
R-squared  Trade  weight  GDP weight
ALl  countries
full  -0.12  0.47  -0.03  0.87  0.72  0.00**
w/o outliers  -0.31  0.07*  0.47  0.00**  0.83  0.00**
LDCs
full  -0.25  0.16  -0.33  0.09*  0.73  0.00**
w/o outliers  -0.24  0.19  0.10  0.76  0.69  0.00**
This puzzling relationship between openness and intervention is also
true if  we compare the openness and intervention measures from Leamer's paper.
Table 8 presents the correlation of Leamer's openness, or endowment adjusted
trade intensity ratio, with each of the potential intervention indices.  The
26  The sign is reversed so that it is an intervention index.22
openness measure is positively correlated with the intervention indices based
on the absolute residuals (both  GDP and total trade weighted), implying that
countries that are more interventionist are also more open.  Openness is very
weakly negatively correlated with the R-squared measure27.
Table 9:  Correlation of Leanier's  opennoss and intervention measures
for 26 LDCs.
Simple correlation  Rank correlation
gdp  trd  r2  GDP  trd  r2
Total
All  0.69  0.67  -0.20  0.44  0.73  -0.07
LDC  0.74  0.63  -0.26  0.31  0.60  -0.21
Mfg
All  0.82  0.75  -0.03  0.60  0.74  0.13
LDC  0.83  0.80  -0.06  0.40  0.64  -0.04
Agr
All  0.54  0.47  -0.35  0.35  0.53  -0.32
LDC  0.58  0.58  -0.33  0.41  0.62  -0.33
Rsc
All  0.59  0.30  -0.29  0.02  0.13  -0.25
LDC  0.63  0.26  -0.29  -0.10  0.00  -0.24
To  summarize  the results of the comparisons  so far; two openness
measures based on trade flows were compared to four potential liberality
measures of outward orientation: NTB coverage, tariffs, price distortions and
trade intervention indices.  Although the structure and endowment adjustments
to trade intensity produced significantly different indices of openness,
neither of them was related in the expected way to any of the liberality
measures, except for average tariffs.
27  For the LDC sample the critical level for the correlation coefficient
to reject at the 5% level the hypothesis that rho=0 is .382,  which none of the
correctly signed correlations achieve.23
31  Comparison  of the  other  outward  orgientation  measures
The  results  of the  previous  section  demonstrate  that  three  potential
measures  of outward  orientationg  non-tariff  barrier  coverage  ratios,  price
distortions,  and  Leamer's  intervention  indices  are  unrelated  to trade
intensity. However,  if  these  measures  were  to agree  amongst  themselves  on  the
ranking  of countries  by outward  orientation  this  might indicate  that  trade
intensity  (however  adjusted)  is  not  an appropriate  proxy  for  outward
orientation. The  next  paragraphs  will  compare  Leamer's  intervention  indices
first  to NTB coverage  and  mean  tariffs,  and  then  to price  distortions.
Finally  the relation  between  NTB  coverage  and  tariffs  and  price  distortions
will  be explored.
Each  of the  Leamer  intervention  measures  was  regressed  against  NT8
coverage  and  mean  tariffs. One  would  expect  that  the  higher  the  NTB coverage
or the  mean  tariff  the higher  the  trade  intervention  index. The  results  in
table  10 go completely  against  that  expectation. The  coefficient  on  NTB
coverage  (in  the top  half  of table  10)  for  total  trade  is  consistently  of  the
wrong  sign  for  each  of  the  measures,  and is  significant  for  the  GDP  weighted
measure. The  same  is true  of  tariffs.
These  negative  results  perhaps  could  be expected  for  three  reasons.
First,  only  26 countries  have  data  both  on NTBs  and  the  Leamer  indices.
Second,  the  Leamer  index  uses  trade  data from  1982  whereas  the  NTS  and  tariff
data  are  from  more recent  years. Third,  Leamer's  indices  are  calculated  from
the  prediction  of net  exports  whereas  the  trade  barrier  data  cover  only
imports. The  hope  that  these  different  cross  country  indices  of outward
orientation  would  be highly  correlated  does  not  bear  out.24
Table 10:  Relationship of Non-tariff barriers, tariffs and Leamer's
intervention  measures.
Intervention index:
GDP weighted  Trade weighted  R2
Non-tariff barrier
Std b  sig lvl  std b  sig lvl  std b  sig lvl
Total
full  -0.38  0.0'**  -0.13  0.57  -0.14  0.54
w/o outliers  -0.43  0.04**  -0.18  0.46  -0.21  0.39
Manufacturing
full  -0.37  0.06*  -0.29  0.22  0.39  0.10
w/o outliers  -0.27  0.18  -0.06  0.82  0.35  0.15
Agriculture
full  -0.28  0.15  -0.15  0.51  -0.36  0.13
w/o outliers  -0.30  0.12  -0.11  0.64  -0.30  0.24
Resources
full  -0.47  0.02**  -0.27  0.25  0.29  0.23
w/o outliers  -0.46  0.02**  -0.10  0.67  -0.02  0.94
Mean tariff
Total
full  -0.63  0.00**  -0.06  0.78  0.05  0.81
w/o outliers  -0.50  0.0'**  0.06  0.77  0.46  0.04*
Manufacturing
full  -0.01  0.95  -0.38  0.08*  0.17  0.44
w/o outliers  -0.19  0.34  -0.26  0.25  -0.30  0.17
Agriculture
full  -0.38  0.05**  -0.13  0.57  -0.14  0.54
w/o outliers  -0.43  0.04**  -0.18  0.46  -0.21  0.39
Resources
full  -0.37  0.06*  -0.29  0.22  0.39  0.10
w/o outliers  -0.27  0.18  -0.06  0.82  0.35  0.15
The comparison of the price distortion measure with the Leamer
intervention indices reveals the same type of conclusions.  If the price
distortion variable were capturing the effect of interventions that altered
the pattern of trade then on would expect that a higher distortion index would
be associated with a higher level of trade intervention, both indicating a
lower level of outward orientation.  In table 11 the simple and rank
correlations for the sample of the price distortion index with each of the25
intervention measures is of the wrong sign, i.e. higher intervention
associated with lower price distortion.  The rank correlations are slightly
better in the overall sample, but are mostly perverse for LDCs considered
separately.
Table 11:  Correlation of Leamer's intervention indices with country
price level distortion.
simple correlation  rank correlation
Interventions  # of
GDP  trade  R2 GDP  trade  R2  countries
All countries  -0.07  -0.04  -0.06  0.01  0.17  0.06  44.00
Non-oil LDCs  -0.05  -0.07  -0.05  -0.15  0.11  -0.06  22.00
Table 12 lists the countries ranked from most to least outward oriented,
as ranked by the price distortion measure and the rankings of those countries
by the inverse of each of the Leamer intervention indices (1 is most open).
The most obvious anomaly is that, while Hong Kong is ranked second by price
distortion, it is consistently low on the ranking by Leamer's intervention
indices.  Even though the lack of internal coherence of Leamer's intervention
indices makes it difficult to asses their reliability (see  below) none of the
indices are associated in the expected way with either administrative measures
of trade barriers (NTBs and tariffs) or with price distortions.
The last two indicators  of outward orientation to be compared are the
price distortion index with the tariff and non-tariff barriers.  If the price
distortion index is capturing the effect of interventions to trade, and if
that effect also is captured by the coverage ratio of non-tariff barriers or
the height of tariff barriers, then one would expect that NTB coverage and
mean tariffs would have a significant positive effect in explaining cross26
c'ountry  variation
Table  12:  Countries  ranked  least  to  most  price
in price  level.  distorted  and  by  Leamer's  intervention
indices
Table  13 presents
the  output  from  GDP  Trade  R2
Sri  Lanka  13  3  2
regressions  of the  Hong  Kong  21  22  18
Bangladesh  1  2  5
price  level  Thailand  11  15  10
Pakistan  7  18  17
distortions  on the  Colombia  9  9  20
Peru  14  5  22
NTB  coverage  ratio  Singapore  22  7  4
Malaysia  17  21  7
and  on mean  tariff  Costa  Rica  20  19  13
Cyprus  18  8  16
charges.  In the  Portugal  19  16  19
Philippines  6  6  12
full  sample  Fiji  2  1  1
Brazil  5  13  14
regressions  NTBs  Turkey  3  17  3
Nicaragua  8  4  6
are almost  Argentina  10  14  21
Morocco  15  11  9
significantly  Dominican  Republic  4  12  15
El Salvador  12  10  11
positively  related  Ivory  Coast  16  20  8
to price
distortion,  but  tariffs  are negatively  related.  The  second  and third  rows  of
table  13 show  that  eliminating  outliers  improves  the  statistical  significance
of this  finding.  This  is the  opposite  of the  previous  results  for  openness  in
which  only  the  tariff  variable  was  significant.
Even  these  mildly  encouraging  results  are  rather  fragile  however,  as
reasonable  sorts  of variations  in the  sample  or the  model  will  change  the  sign
and  significance  of the  NTB  variable  as well  as,  fortunately,  the  tariff
variable.  Three  variations  are especially  significant  because  the  source  of
the  data  on price  distortions  was  Summers  and  Heston  ICP project  price  levels.
One  variation  in the  sample  eliminates  those  countries  for which  the  data  was27
graded a "D"  by Summer and Heston (1988),  which were generally those countries
for which no benchmark survey had ever been done and the price levels were
pure extrapolations.  This reduces the estimated impact of NTBs by half and
raises the p-level to .61,  well above statistical significance.  Secondly,
adding GDP per capita to the equation reverses the sign and eliminates the
significance of the NTB variable (although  tariffs are still perverse and
significant).  Third, either adding an African dummy variable or eliminating
the African countries completely changes the results on NTBs.  The sample
sensitivity of the results indicates that the relationship between price level
distortion and NTBs depends critically on the price level information for
Africa (which  tends to have the lowest GDP and highest NTBs) which is the most
unreliable.  In any case the promising results for NTBs are tempered by the
uniformly perverse results for tariffs.
Table 13:  Impact of non-tariff coverage and tariffs on price level
distortion index.
NTB  Tariffs
std  sig  std  sig
b  lvl  b  lvl
full  0.208  0.111  -0.221  0.092*
w/o 3 outliers  0.311  0.019**  -0.265  0.045**
w/o 10 outliers  0.325  0.020**  -0.301  0.031**
w/o S-H =  D data  0.096  0.609  -0.133  0.477
w/o African  0.071  0.680  -0.193  0.265
w/ Africa dummy  -0.037  0.713  -0.122  0.206
w/  GDP per capita  -0.009  0.934  -0.240  0.028**
w/o  NTB  =  100  -0.045  0.782  -0.125  0.447
III.  InterDretation and implications
The empirical results of this paper show that a number of promising
candidates for a summary measure of outward orientation in LDCs  (adjusted
trade intensity, NTB coverage, tariff levels, price distortions, and trade28
pattern deviation) are nearly completely unrelated in a cross-country data
set.  The two questions that need to be asked are: why is this so? and what
are the implications for future research?
The interpretation of the validity of any of one of the particular
measures of outward orientation is complicated by the fact that they are
individually and collectively uncorrelated.  The only thing can be asserted
with any confidence is that all of the measures are not successfully measuring
some country specific, time persistent, aspect of policy outward orientation.
If it had been the case that several of the indicators were strongly
correlated and one had disagreed with the rest, then this partial consensus
would have strengthened the claims of those that agreed and indicted the
loner.  Unfortunately, even this partial agreement was not found.  Each
outward orientation measure must stand on its own merits, with the distinct
possibility that none of them deserve even moderate confidence.  The next
paragraphs review the claims for each of the measures.
Leamer's intervention indices probably have the least intrinsic
plausibility for three reasons.  First, the inherent incredibility of the
model used in creating the predicted pattern of trade, the deviations from
which are treated as the result of policy distortions.  Although the HOV model
is the best game in town and Leamer is its best player, the assumptions which
need to be imposed to estimate trade patterns as a function of a few crudely
measured endowments and treat the residuals as indicators of trade barriers
strain credibility 28. Second, although each of the intervention indices are
based on exactly the same notion of intervention, i.e. the deviation of the
28 This  basically agrees  with  Leamer's  conclusion "It  seems  highly unlikely
that these large residuals should be attributed completely to trade barriers."
(Leamer 1988, pg. 189).29
pattern of net exports from the model's prediction, seemingly minor details of
the construction of the summary measures (such  as whether the squared
residuals or absolute values are used) actually make a huge difference in the
country ordering (compare  the rankings in table 12).  Finally, the ranking by
the intervention rates scaled by GDP by predicted trade are intuitively
unappealing.  For instance, the GDP scaled intervention rate indicates that in
i982 Singapore and Hong Kong were the most interventionist countries and
Bangladesh and Turkey the least.
Using price level distortions as an outward orientation measure raises
two questions, first, the validity of price level data and secondly, their
interpretation as (inverse)  outward orientation measures.  Summers and Heston
(1988)  presents the results of Phase IV of the ICP project and reviews the
continuing limitations of the data.  The most important limitation for the
comparisons in LDCs, is that to date very few of the African countries have
had the benchmark survey price collection that is the basis of the ICP
project.  Price levels for the non-benchmark countries are extrapolated from
the data of the benchmark countries.  Summers and Heston grade the data
reliability from A (most  reliable) to D (unreliable) and all but seven of the
African countries are grade D.
Even if we accept the price level data, are the country deviations from
that level an adequate indicator of outward orientation?  It is a
fundamentally measure of the overvaluation of the currency relative to its PPP
level.  Although generally the support of an overvalued currency entails
import controls there are other reasons for overvaluation (such as foreign aid
availability 29) than as a consequence of import controls.
29 See Van Wijnbergen (1985) for  empirical evidence from Africa.30
The price distortion measure produces some counter-intuitive outward
orientation rankings.  The top five most outward oriented countries over the
1973-85 period by this measure are Sri Lanka, Hong Kong, Bangladesh, Mexico,
and Nepal.  Among the non-African LDCs South Korea is in the bottom third in
outward orientation, ranked 33rd of 44.
The incidence frequency measures of non-tariff barriers are solid in one
sense as they depend directly on legal and administrative facts.  However, NTB
coverage may not be an adequate indicator of openness across countries for
several reasons.  First, the NTB coverage ratios must aggregate together very
different types of non-tariff barriers (quotas, licenses, health regulaticns,
etc.) which may have very different impact on imports.  Second, even for a
single type of import barrier a coverage ratio cannot capture the variations
in implementation of import policy across countries.  The requirement of a
discretionary import license can result in distortions of differing severity.
These differences will be impossible to capture with incidence data 30.
Structure adjusted openness has two major weaknesses as an outward
orienitation  measure.  First, the overall flow of trade relative to domestic
activity says nothing about the distortion of trade.  For instance, a country
could offset barriers to imports  which protect domestic production of goods in
which the country has no natural comparative advantage with subsidies to
export production of goods for which the country again has no comparative
advantage.  This country could be simultaneously  more open but more distorted
than another country with completely liberal trade policies.  The second
30  Even  if  the  barrier  data  could  be  augmented  by  administrative
information (such as the percent of license applications gran-..ed)  this would
likely be of  little help in cross country comparisons as the administrative
procedures produce different incentives.  For instance, some import licensing
mechanisms encourage redundant applications much more than others.31
problem is the atheoretic nature of the adjustment of actual openness.  While
the structural characteristics of size and GDP per capita are empirically
important in determining trade flows, these account for only 35% of the total
variation in openness across countries.  It is difficult to believe that the
unexplained variation is due entirely, or even primarily, to trade barriers.
Finally, this measure throws up its own conundrums.  Of 72 LDCs the top six
most open countries in 1985 were: Singapore, Jordan, Benin, Belize, Guyana,
and Brazil.  Hong Kong was the 32nd most open, S. Korea S7th, and Chile the
65th.
The strength of Leamer's adjusted trade intensity ratio is that it is
derived from the empirical application of a theory of the pattern of trade.
The weakness is that the measure of openness inherits the defects of the
theory as well as the inherent limitations in measuring the endowment of
factors (such  as skilled labor)  which determine the trade pattern.  The two
major empirical concerns are that the structure adjusted and endowment
adjusted trade intensity ratios are less highly correlated than either with
the unadjusted, implying that the adjustments move the openness rankings in
opposite directions.  However, the rankings of the LDCs by openness (see  data
appendix table 4) are quite intuitive,  with Singapore, Hong Kong and Malaysia
as the most open countries and Peru, Cameroon and Argentina as the least open.
Unfortunately I cannot conclude the interpretation of the empirical
results with a glowing recommendation for any particular potential measure of
outward orientation against the others.  Nor, given the lack of an adequate
standard, can any of the candidates be rejected outright.  The complete
absence of correlation amongst them is skeptically interpreted as an
indictment of each.  However, that one (but onlv one) of the measures captures
best outward orientation cannot be rejected.32
B)  Imolications
Before focussing on the narrow issue of the implications for cross
country research let me preface by saying that this paper obviously has no
implications for overall conclusions on outward orientation and performance.
Even accepting the validity of the notion outward orientation measures, the
evidence from cross country performance regressions is the least persuasive
element of the case for outward orientation.  The multi-country reviews of in
depth country studies such as Little, Scitovsky and Scott (1970), Krueger
(1978) and Balassa (1982) are much more convincing.  Secondly, the reported
regression results in studies using these measures are of course not called
into question, only their interpretation.
There are two principal implications of the empirical results in this
paper.  First, no reliable, robust estimate of the impact of general outward
orientation  on  economic  performance  (i.e.  economic  growth  or  export
performance)  is  likely  to  be  possible  from  cross  country  data.  For  instance,
the  regressions  in  Edwards  (1989)  rely  on  Leamner's  intervention  measure  in  a
regression explaining cross country growth.  Using  a  measure  equally  valid a
priori, such as Leamer's openness (adjusted  trade intensity)3 ,  import
penetration ratios or some combination of tariff and nontariff barriers data
would have almost certainly produced different results.  This is not to say
that particular variables, such as the price distortion variable, won't
perform well (i.e. have a high t-statistic) in explaining cror  J  country
31As  noted  above  the  openness  and  intervention ratios  are  negatively
correlated. Even  more striking  the  correlation  between  the intervention  measures
(measures of fit of the model to a country's trade) is surprisingly low, the
correlation between the intervention (the sum of the absolute values of the
residuals) scaled by GDP and scaled by predicted trade only .16  and between GDP
scaled intervention and R-squared (which  squares the residuals) -.02 (it  should
be negative as a lower R2 implies a worse fit whereas a higher intervention is
a worse fit) but here it is essentially zero.33
variation in economic performance.  However, inferring that type of empirical
result is due to effects of outward oriented policy stance requires additional
evidence establishing a link between the measure and policy.
Secondly, while large changes in the NTB coverage ratio in a particular
country are more likely to indicate a movement towards import liberalization
than similar differences between countries at a point in time, reliance on the
NTB coverage ratio as the key indicator of liberalization (Laird and Nogues,
1989) needs to recognize the lack of supporting evidence linking the coverage
ratio to observable trade outcomes.  Potentially, even for a given country,
substantial variations in coverage ratios are compatible with equal aggregate
import restrictiveness.  While the administrative and legal nature of NTBs
makes them an easily monitorable indicator on which to base conditionality in
liberalization programs, the generally discretionary nature of NTB
implementation needs to be recognized, so that the removal of a particular
type of legal restrictions not be considered synonymous with increased outward
orientation.
The conclusion of this paper, that alternative objective summary
measures of policy outward orientation produce entirely different country
rankings is probably not an astounding revelation.  Those who have worked on
trade policy in LDCs know that trade regulations and barriers are generally
complex legally and even more opaque in their actual administration.  The hope
that a reasonably straightforward (although not cheap or simple, as the NTB,
price distortion, and Leamer's measures are the result of a massive empirical
effort) measure can produce a "correct" ranking of countries has always been
treated  skeptically, and, disappointingly, rightly so.34
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Data Appendix
The data appendix  describes  the source and methods  for the data used in the paper.
A) Tariffs and non-tariff  barriers.
The information  for each country  on the tariffs and non-tariff  barriers to trade was taken
from country  pages in the UNCTAD (1988)  publication. For each country the trade weighted
averages  of total charges and frequency  of non-tariff  measures  for food (SITC  0+1+22+4),
agricultural  raw materials  (SITC 2 less 22,27,28), crude fertilizers (SITC 27+28), mineral  fuels
(SITC 3), non-ferrous  metals (SITC 68) and manufactures  (SITC 5 through 8 less 68) were entered.
Weighted  averages  for Agriculture  and Resources  categories  were formed from the sub-aggregates
reported using the 1985 world trade weights. Data appendix  tables I and 2 present the raw data,
sorted by overall trade barriers.
B) Leamer's measures  of openness
Measures  of openness  and trade intervention  for each of the four aggregates:  overall,
manufactures  (SITC 51 to 96, less 63,64,68,94), agriculture  (SITC 1-26,29,41-43),  and resources
(SITC 27,28,32 to 35 and 68) were taken from Leamer (1988). The estimates  used were from the
model estimated  after scaling by GDP which tends to fit the smaller LDC countries  better" 2. The
openness  measure is from Table 6.8: Openness  measures:  adjusted  trade intensity ratios, regression
model; Table 6.10: Country R2, regression  model; Table 6.11: Intervention  rates, regression  model,
scaled by GNP; Table 6.12: Intervention  rates, regression model, scaled by predicted  trade.  The
formulas  for the various measures  for the ith country are:  Eu is the residual (actual  minus predicted)
of the net exports of the j'  commodity  for the is country. Adjusted  trade intensity is l:EU/(3DP,.
GDP weighted  intervention  is E I  E  /GDP,, predicted  trade E 3I  E, I IN', where N7  is predicted  trade.
The R 2 for each country is SJE,/GDP,  I Ej((T,-T 1, where T 1j is actual trade.
C? Import penetration  ratios.
Trade intensity and import  penetration  ratios were calculated  using data on imports in US$
for 1982 and 1985 (the latest year with generally  available  data) from the UNSO trade data base,
accessed  using the World Bank's TARS  system.  The aggregates  were overall, manufacturing  (SITC
5 to 8 less 68), agriculture  (SITC 0+1+2+4,  less 27,28) and resources (SITC 27+28+3+68).
The ratios of trade to GDP were calculated  using dollar GDP data from the National  Accounts (NA)
database maintained  by the World Bank, accessed  through BESD.  -te structure  adjusted intensity
data are in table 3.
D) Price distortion  index
Summers-Heston  (1988)  reported on data from the Intermational  Comparisons  Project (ICP).
The ICP has collected  detailed price observations  from a large number of countries  to construct  price
32  As Leamer says (p 186) "it is  best  to  think  of  ... the  scaled  model  as
describing the smaller countries."37
levels in a common  currency. A measure  of price distortion was built in Dollar (1990)  from this
data, estimating  the price level as a function  of GDP per capita and regional dummy variables and
using deviations  from this norm as a distortion  index.  The raw data, sorted from least to most
distorted, is in table 5.
E) Other variables
The data on land area and population  were taken from the World Bank's Social Indicators
database  through BESD. The data on the CIF/FOB margin were taken from the IMF's IFS.  GDP
per capita in 1985  was taken from Summers  and Heston 1985, along with the grade for the data.  Oil
exporters  are those with greater than 30% of oil exports, taken from the World Development  Report,
1988.38
Data appendix, table A.ls Structure adjusted trade intensity ratios, 1985, by
rank, LDCs and industrial countries.
Overall  Manuf.  Agric.  Resources Unadjusted
R  R  %  R  R
LDC's
Singapore  145.9  1  71.6  1  17.5  4  48.7  1  252.4
Guyana  80.7  2  15.8  11  17.8  3  44.8  2  126.7
Baharain  69.1  4  21.3  6  2.7  26  44.7  3  153.0
Congo, Peoplele Rep.  54.6  6  20.1  8  0.5  35  33.8  4  83.4
Gambia  36.1  7  16.7  10  22.6  2  -2.7  50  74.4
Togo  35.5  8  14.5  12  6.7  13  14.3  9  73.0
Hong Kong  34.8  9  55.4  2  -0.2  39 -19.2  92  139.2
Papua New Guinea  28.9  11  2.1  29  10.3  7  10.2  13  74.8
Jordan  27.2  12  11.6  16  2.1  28  9.8  14  83.4
Jamaica  27.2  13  2.1  30  3.1  24  22.6  5  79.4
Ivory Coast  26.8  14  0.8  34  24.2  1  2.0  25  67.9
Malaysia  24.1  16  5.2  25  9.5  8  10.5  12  91.3
Egypt  22.5  17  20.8  7  7.6  11  -6.3  73  44.3
Cameroon  20.6  18  11.3  17  4.7  19  4.1  19  45.5
Indor.'sia  19.7  19  14.3  13  2.0  29  2.8  23  32.8
India  18.6  20  7.7  24  4.8  16  5.9  17  11.5
Malta  14.0  21  23.5  5  -1.5  47  -8.0  78  99.2
Benin  13.0  22  9.4  21  1.6  31  2.6  24  50.6
Mali  12.4  23  10.2  19  4.8  17  -2.7  48  42.1
Zaire  11.5  24  4.7  27  -5.9  73  11.7  10  32.6
Algeria  9.6  25  8.3  23  0.1  37  1.0  26  36.0
Malawi  8.0  26  5.1  26  7.5  12  -4.0  56  44.0
Nigeria  7.9  27  10.0  20  -3.2  60  0.3  27  20.6
Zambia  5.6  28  0.4  36 -11.5  93  17.0  7  40.5
Senegal  4.6  29  -0.9  44  6.1  14  -0.2  31  44.5
Haiti  3.6  30  13.3  14  -5.1  73  -5.0  65  42.9
Kenya  3.2  31  -0.0  39  0.4  36  3.4  20  38.6
Ecuador  3.0  32  0.0  38  3.6  22  -0.5  32  43.2
Korea, Rep. of  0.9  34  12.5  15  -7.5  89  -2.7  49  64.8
Costa Rica  0.2  35  1.1  31  10.4  6 -10.8  88  62.0
Sri Lanka  -0.1  36  -2.3  50  4.1  20  -1.0  38  49.2
Niger  -1.6  38  11.2  18  -7.2  88  -5.1  66  28.8
Brazil  -2.0  39  -1.3  46  0.6  34  -0.8  37  17.2
Morocco  -2.1  40  -0.8  43  -0.9  42  -0.5  33  44.7
Sudan  -2.9  41  1.0  32  0.7  33  -4.2  57  21.9
Portugal  -4.9  43  -0.7  41  -0.9  43  -2.2  43  66.6
Tunisia  -5.0  44  -0.7  42  -6.4  83  3.1  22  49.8
Zimbabwe  -5.8  45  -2.3  49  -2.8  56  -0.7  35  35.4
Suriname  -6.0  46 -22.8  88  -2.1  53  19.5  6  63.7
Central African Rep.  -6.8  47  0.6  35  -1.3  46  -5.6  70  27.1
Burundi  -7.0  48  -1.2  45  -1.9  51  -3.7  55  28.8
Madagascar  -10.2  50  -3.0  53  -3.5  61  -3.0  51  24.5
Dominican Republic  -10.4  52  -0.6  40  -1.9  52  -9.4  85  41.8
Thailand  -10.4  53  -5.7  60  -1.3  45  -3.3  53  39.2
Uganda  -10.4  54  -7.3  64  1.9  30  -4.5  61  23.939
Data appendix, table A.l: Structure adjusted trade intensity ratios, 1985, by
rank, LDCs and industrial countries (cont.)
Overall  Manuf.  Agric.  Resources Unadjusted
t  R  %  R  %  R  %  R  %
Fiji  -11.2  55 -12.8  76  4.8  18  -4.4  60  53.2
Pakistan  -11.6  56  -3.7  55  -4.7  70  -2.5  46  26.2
Bangladesh  -12.2  57  -2.9  52  -5.1  72  -3.6  54  22.8
Ghana  -12.4  59  -4.7  58  -2.8  57  -4.3  59  22.0
Syran Arab Rep.  -12.4  60  -4.1  56  -0.9  41  -7.4  75  33.3
Venezuela  -12.6  61  -7.6  67  -3.9  64  -0.7  36  35.4
Philippines  -13.0  62 -11.5  74  -6.0  80  -2.3  44  31.5
El Salvador  -13.0  63  -7.6  65  3.8  21  -8.7  81  33.1
Barbados  -14.8  64  -1.6  48  -3.0  59  -9.2  83  69.5
Tanzania  -15.1  65  -3.1  54  -7.0  85  -4.7  63  15.4
Burkina Fauo  -15.3  66  -4.5  57  -6.4  82  -4.5  62  19.5
Cyprus  -16.4  68  -7.6  66  -0.1  38  -7.3  74  68.7
Nepal  -16.6  69  -1.5  47  -9.0  92  -5.3  68  20.3
Sierra Leone  -16.6  70  -5.3  59  -8.0  91  -3.1  52  20.2
Rwanda  -18.9  73  -7.7  68  -5.1  71  -5.6  71  16.8
Turkey  -19.2  75  -9.2  72  -6.7  84  -2.1  42  35.7
Yemen, Arab Rep. of  -21.2  77  -6.7  62  -6.1  81  -7.6  77  21.3
Mexico  -23.0  78  -6.5  61  -2.6  55 -14.1  90  20.9
United Arab Emirates  -23.0  79 -26.4  92  -2.9  58  7.2  15  68.1
Trinidad & Tobago  -23.1  80 -16.8  83  -1.0  44  -4.3  58  54.5
Peru  -24.7  81 -16.5  82  -7.6  90  0.2  28  24.5
Paraguay  -27.2  82 -14.1  78  -3.5  62  -8.7  80  25.9
Chile  -27.8  84 -23.0  89  -4.1  66  0.1  29  38.0
Guatemala  -29.1  85 -16.2  81  -4.7  69  -7.6  76  21.1
Nicaragua  -30.a  86 -17.4  85  -1.5  48 -10.6  87  24.2
Iran  -33.9  87 -14.6  79  -4.4  67 -14.7  91  12.5
Colombia  -34.5  88 -20.0  86  -5.4  77  -8.2  79  20.1
Argentina  -35.9  89 -23.1  90  -2.3  54  -9.2  84  18.8
Kuwait  -37.7  90 -22.2  87  -1.6  50 -13.1  89  49.5
Uruguay  -38.0  91 -23.3  91  -3.6  63  -9.6  86  30.9
Oman  -43.4  93 -10.8  73  -1.6  49 -31.2  93  37.6
'ndustrial countries
Ireland  70.9  3  47.6  3  12.3  5  7.1  16  118.4
Belgium  62.5  5  40.6  4  6.1  15  10.9  11  132.0
Netherlands, The  30.9  10  9.0  22  8.4  9  14.3  8  98-4
Canada  24.9  15  17.9  9  3.0  25  3.3  21  45.6
Norway  2.0  33  2.8  28  1.0  32  -1.7  40  55.4
United States  -0.8  37  -2.5  51  2.7  27  -1.1  39  14.1
Australia  -3.0  42  -7.8  69  -0.5  40  5.1  18  24.6
Sweden  -8.7  49  0.4  37  -5.3  75  -2.6  47  59.2
New Zealand  -10.3  51 -15.1  80  7.7  10  -2.5  45  52.5
Denmark  -12.2  58  -8.6  71  3.3  23  -5.8  72  59.6
Switzerland  -16.1  67  0.9  33  -7.0  87  -8.8  82  55.3
Finland  -17.0  71  -8.3  70  -5.3  76  -2.1  41  49.8
Germany, Federal Rep.  -17-1  72  -6.8  63  -4.6  68  -5.4  69  51.140
Data  appendix, table A.1: Structure adjusted trade intengity ratios, 1985, by
rank, LDCe and industrial countries (cont.)
Overall  Manuf.  Agric.  Resources Unadjusted
t  R  %  R  %  R  %  R
Italy  -19.2  74 -13.6  77  -5.2  74  0.1  30  38.5
United Kingdom  -19.4  76 -12.6  75  -5.5  78  -0.7  34  43.9
France  -27.3  83 -17.2  84  -3.9  65  -4.8  64  38.2
Japan  -40.0  92 -26.8  93  -7.0  86  -5.1  67  22.541
Data appendix, table A.2: UNCTAD data on NTB frequency, by major aggregate,
the indicator for overall foreign exchange licensing,
overall  Manuf.  Agric.  Resources
Ratio  R  Ratio  R  Ratio  R  Ratio  R FEX
Bahamas  0.1  1  0.1  2  0.0  1  0.0  5  1
United Arab EM  0.5  2  0.3  3  1.5  4  0.1  9  0
Qatar  1.2  3  1.2  4  1.5  5  0.0  1  0
Papua New Guinea  1.3  4  0.0  1  7.2  10  0.0  3  0
Bahrain  3.5  5  4.6  7  1.8  6  0.0  6  0
Oman  4.0  6  5.2  9  1.5  3  0.1  14  0
Costa Rica  4.1  7  6.0  11  0.0  2  0.0  2  1
Kuwait  7.9  8  7.2  14  15.1  18  0.3  19  0
Sudan  8.0  9  8.4  16  12.2  14  0.0  7  0
Malaysia  8.2  10  9.1  19  11.3  13  0.2  16  0
Saudi Arabia  8.4  11  8.8  18  14.4  17  0.1  11  0
Libya  9.4  12  10.0  23  14.3  16  0.0  8  1
Solomon Isld  10.7  13  11.3  25  16.3  20  0.2  17  1
Belize  10.7  14  5.9  10  37.0  32  0.7  20  1
Nepal  11.0  15  14.1  31  6.5  9  0.1  10  0
Singapore  12.9  16  12.8  29  19.7  23  3.9  23  0
Somalia  13.0  17  5.0  8  4.1  8  58.9  36  0
Guatemala  13.1  18  10.6  24  32.2  30  0.3  18  0
Barbados  13.3  19  11.4  26  26.0  27  6.0  25  0
Korea RP  14.2  20  14.6  32  24.3  26  0.1  15  0
Hong Kong  14.3  21  3.3  5  9.0  12  73.4  42  0
Senegal  14.9  22  8.5  17  28.5  28  26.9  32  0
Cameroon  15.3  23  17.9  35  16.0  19  1.1  22  0
Grenada  15.8  24  9.5  20  50.5  39  0.0  4  0
Chile  16.1  25  6.5  12  12.3  15  67.6  38  0
Central African Re  16.7  26  4.0  6  16.4  21  76.5  44  0
Jamaica  16.7  27  13.9  30  39.9  34  0.1  13  0
Jordan  16.8  28  7.1  13  66.5  45  0.1  12  0
Nigeria  18.4  29  12.4  28  46.1  36  12.6  28  0
Thailand  20.2  30  16.3  33  36.8  31  18.0  31  0
Ivory Coast  20.6  31  9.9  22  18.5  22  73.9  43  0
Uruguay  20.6  32  11.7  27  3.4  7  83.9  49  0
Argentina  21.2  33  28.4  40  8.4  11  1.1  21  0
Paraguay  22.5  34  8.4  15  32.1  29  77.0  45  1
Mexico  24.1  35  9.9  21  39.7  33  72.4  41  0
Sri Lanka  27.1  36  17.3  34  22.5  25  77.3  46  0
Haiti  27.6  37  26.2  37  43.4  35  16.5  30  0
Trinidad & Tobago  33.5  38  27.4  38  48.7  38  42.0  33  0
Ghana  38.4  39  33.5  41  83.7  54  5.8  24  0
Egypt  38.6  40  35.4  42  46.4  37  42.8  35  0
Morocco  39.7  41  23.0  36  66.7  46  84.4  50  1
Yugoslavia  40.4  42  27.7  39  68.0  47  69.1  39  1
Brazil  44.1  43  41.0  45  22.4  24  84.7  51  0
Venezuela  46.1  44  47.8  48  69.8  48  6.3  26  1
Cyprus  47.5  45  39.8  43  62.7  42  65.4  37  042
Data  appendix,  table  A.2:  UNCTAD  data  on NTB  frequency,  by major  aggregate,
and  Indicator  for overal-l.  foreigni exchange  licensing  (cont.)
overall  Manuf.  Agric  Resources
Ratio  R  Ratio  R  Ratio  R  Ratio  R FEX
Ecuador  51.0  46  51.2  49  79.7  51  14.5  29  0
Zaire  53.1  47  46.2  47  55.0  41  86.0  53  0
Bangladesh  55.1  48  43.6  46  72.6  49  88.5  55  0
Peru  55.5  49  40.8  44  89.4  58  85.3  52  1
Madagascar  56.0  50  63.4  51  63.7  43  8.9  27  1
Philippines  63.6  51  69.5  52  55.8  41  42.7  34  0
Algeria  68.4  52  60.1  50  86.6  56  87.4  54  0
Kenya  73.0  53  69.8  53  81.4  52  77.6  47  0
Colombia  76.9  54  72.6  55  81.6  53  89.6  56  0
Tunisia  77.6  55  71.7  54  84.0  55  94.1  58  0
Pakistan  85.4  56  81.6  56  91.1  59  96.8  59  0
Burkina  Faso  86.8  57  91.1  59  66.4  44  93.4  57  0
India  87.4  58  83.1  57  94.4  61  99.4  60  0
Turkey  90.6  59  97.8  60  79.7  50  70.2  40  0
Indonesia  92.5  60  89.8  58  96.2  62  100.0  61  0
Malawi  94.4  61  98.5  61  88.0  57  83.2  48  0
Iran  98.8  62  98.6  62  94.2  60  100.0  73  0
Syria  Arab  RP  100.0  63  100.0  63  100.0  63  100.0  62  0
Sierra  Leone  100.0  64  100.0  64  100.0  64  100.0  63  1
Guyana  100.0  65  100.0  65  100.0  65  100.0  64  0
China  100.0  66  100.0  66  100,0  66  100.0  65  1
Burundi  100.0  67  100.0  67  100.0  67  100.0  66  0
Mozambique  100.0  68  100.0  68  100.0  68  100.0  67  0
Zimbabwe  100.0  69  100.0  69  100.0  69  100.0  68  1
Zambia  100.0  70  100.0  70  100.0  70  100.0  69  0
Yemen  100.0  71  100.0  71  100.0  71  100.0  70  0
Uganda  100.0  72  100.0  72  100.0  72  100.0  71  0
Tanzania  100.0  73  100.0  73  100.0  73  100.0  72  0
Congo  100.0  74  100.0  74  100.0  74  100.0  74  0
Benin  100.0  75  100,0  75  100.0  75  100.0  75  043
Data appendix, table A.3: UNCTAD data on mean total import charges by major
aggregate, in percent and rank
overall  Manuf.  Agric.  Resources
%  R  %  R  %  R  %  R
Singapore  1.2  1  1.4  1  0.0  2  1.8  3
Oman  2.1  2  2.4  2  1.7  5  1.3  2
Hong Kong  2.5  3  3.7  3  0.0  1  0.0  1
Saudi Arabia  3.7  4  4.1  6  1.4  3  4.4  10
Qatar  4.3  5  4.0  5  5.4  7  4.0  7
United Arab EM  4.3  6  4.7  7  1.5  4  5.9  13
Kuwait  6.5  7  3.9  4  2.1  6  23.1  48
Bahrain  7.2  8  7.6  8  7.6  8  5.0  12
Yugoslavia  11.3  9  13.1  9  8.4  9  6.0  14
Papua New Guinea  13.1  10  13.8  10  11.2  15  10.3  28
Mexico  13.4  11  16.0  13  10.4  14  4.3  9
Haiti  14.6  12  14.3  11  23.3  32  4.9  11
Malaysia  15.0  13  18.2  16  8.5  10  3.7  6
Solomon Isld  15.8  14  15.7  12  20.7  28  9.9  25
Barbados  16.2  15  19.0  17  9.1  11  6.9  16
Guyana  16.4  16  19.3  18  9.3  12  7.0  18
Jamaica  16.7  17  19.7  22  9.8  13  6.9  17
Guatemala  17.3  18  16.5  14  21.2  29  10.2  27
Uganda  18.1  19  17.7  15  27.8  40  8.3  22
Zaire  18.2  20  19.6  19  18.9  25  7.2  20
Algeria  18.2  21  22.1  27  15.5  20  2.4  5
Indonesia  18.4  22  22.0  26  16.3  22  4.1  8
Malawi  19.1  23  21.7  25  16.1  21  7.2  19
Cyprus  19.9  24  23.9  28  13.7  17  7.5  21
Chile  20.2  25  19.7  21  22.4  31  20.0  41
Yemen  20.5  26  19.7  20  24.5  37  19.5  40
Nigeria  20.5  27  21.0  23  32.4  52  10.7  29
Nepal  20.8  28  25.4  35  11.8  16  2.2  4
Zimbabwe  20.8  29  21.2  24  22.3  30  22.4  46
Sierra Leone  21.8  30  25.1  32  14.7  19  21.0  44
Belize  22.2  31  25.2  34  14.6  18  12.9  32
Korea RP  22.7  32  25.0  31  23.7  34  10.2  26
Ivory Coast  22.9  33  24.6  30  17.2  24  21.0  43
Syria Arab RP  24.5  34  25.2  33  23.4  33  22.8  47
Mozambique  24.5  35  24.0  29  28.9  44  23.6  49
Somalia  24.8  36  25.5  36  36.3  56  6.9  15
Zambia  25.8  37  26.1  37  29.8  47  19.3  39
Grenada  25.9  38  29.2  41  20.1  27  15.3  35
Jordan  27.1  39  32.2  48  16.3  23  12.4  31
Tunisia  27.5  40  28.0  40  27.8  42  10.7  30
Uruguay  27.6  41  27.8  39  24.3  36  30.5  59
Congo  28.7  42  30.5  43  24.2  35  24.3  50
Philippines  29.8  43  30.8  44  31.2  50  22.1  45
Senegal  29.9  44  30.5  42  29.7  45  26.8  55
Burundi  30.9  45  27.4  38  52.4  64  15.3  3644
Data  appendix,  table  A.3:  UNCTAD  data  on mean  total  tariff  charges  by major
aggregate,  in percent  and rank  (cont.)
Overall  Manuf.  Agric.  Resources
%  R  %  R  %  R  %  R
Ghana  31.0  46  31.0  45  30.4  48  32.8  61
Venezuela  31.4  47  31.0  46  34.7  53  25.5  53
China  32.1  48  37.1  54  30.6  49  9.2  24
Bahamas  33.1  49  34.8  50  27.7  39  29.4  58
Central  African  Re  33.7  50  36.9  53  27.0  38  24.7  51
Morocco  34.6  51  35.1  51  29.8  46  37.5  67
Tanzania  35.0  52  35.1  52  34.8  54  35.6  66
Sri  Lanka  35.4  53  31.3  47  44.4  60  44.6  69
Madagascar  35.6  54  37.2  55  45.4  61  16.5  38
Libya  36.5  55  38.4  56  19.5  26  54.4  71
Thailand  36.9  56  40.4  58  36.7  57  13.2  33
Kenya  36.9  57  39.0  57  35.0  55  13.4  34
Cameroon  37.0  58  40.6  59  27.8  41  28.2  56
costa  Rica  37.2  59  33.3  49  55.1  66  32.6  60
Argentina  38.6  60  41.2  60  32.3  51  33.9  64
Ecuador  39.1  61  42.9  62  48.4  62  8.8  23
Egypt  41.4  62  42.6  61  57.3  68  16.0  37
Trinidad  & Tobago  41.6  63  45.9  64  27.9  43  33.9  63
Benin  42.2  64  44.7  63  38.9  59  32.9  62
Turkey  44.8  65  46.9  65  37.3  58  26.7  54
Sudan  47.0  66  49.4  66  54.6  65  25.5  52
Peru  56.1  67  63.7  68  48.5  63  29.2  57
Paraguay  63.6  68  58.7  67  72.9  73  77.0  74
Bangladesh  67.1  69  72.8  70  56.9  67  40.6  68
Burkina  Faso  67.5  70  67.6  69  69.6  72  63.1  73
Pakistan  68.5  71  78.3  72  58.3  69  35.4  65
Iran  70.1  72  80.4  74  69.2  70  20.4  42
Colombia  73.7  73  77.0  71  74.2  74  56.5  72
Brazil  75.2  74  78.5  73  69.6  71  47.5  70
India  140.0  75  149.4  75  125.8  75  109.4  75Data  appendix,  table  A.4:  The  rank  oi thc  \,ayr.icon  trade  openness  measures  from
Leamer  (1988)  for  each  of the  aggregates.
Overall  Manufacturino  Agriculture  Resources
OP  IG  IT  R  Op  IG  iT  r  C  oP  IG  IT  R  OP  IG  IT  R
Singapore  1  26  10  6  2  25  12  S  17  21  10  16  1  26  14  9
Hong  Kong  2  25  26  23  1  26  26  22  4  16  26  14  20  24  25  23
Malaysia  3  21  24  9  4  20  23  11  1  25  25  8  3  16  11  5
Trin  & Tob  4  23  25  19  3  23  21  12  10  10  19  20  2  25  26  19
Ivory  Coast  5  20  23  10  5  21  25  23  2  24  12  1  5  19  23  21
Turkey  6  2  19  5  8  7  19  15  7  6  24  15  7  3  4  3
Costa  Rica  7  24  21  18  9  22  17  17  3  26  17  4  22  23  22  22
Yugoslavia  8  8  22  14  6  14  24  19  11  2  20  21  12  12  16  16
Thailand  9  15  17  15  16  .13  15  21  5  19  22  11  8  4  7  12
Sri Lanka  10  17  5  4  1i  12  5  3  8  22  9  3  10  6  3  2
Indonesia  11  7  4  3  18  s  - 4  13  3  13  13  4  21  6  7
Morocco  12  19  13  12  15  19  3  20  9  20  21  19  9  17  12  11
Pakistan  13  9  20  22  7  11  20  18  18  12  18  17  18  8  15  20
Ecuador  14  3  18  2  13  8  18  7  6  5  23  6  24  7  5  6
Philippines  15  6  9  17  12  6  11  14  16  7  15  18  21  13  8  14
Nicaragua  16  10  6  8  21  16  E  9  15  37  3  5  13  2  2  4
Solom.  Isld  17  13  14  16  25  17  14  24  12  15  16  12  6  11  20  13
Cyprus  18  22  11  21  17  24  9  8  20  23  14  23  16  20  19  18
Bangladesh  19  1  2  7  20  1  1  2  19  1  1  2  15  1  10  8
Sau.Arab.  20  5  1  1  10  3  2  1  22  4  4  24  23  14  1  1
Egypt  21  12  7  ii  24.  lb  6  30  14  14  8  9  11  10  17  15
Brazil  22  4  15  20  19  2  22  26  24  9  11  26  19  5  9  10
Argentina  23  16  16  25  23  10  16  25  23  18  6  22  14  9  24  24
Colombia  24  11  12  24  14  4  10  6  21  13  7  7  25  18  21  26
Cameroon  25  14  3  13  26  18  4  16  26  11  2  10  17  15  13  17
Peru  26  18  8  26  22  9  7  13  25  8  5  25  26  22  18  25
Note:  Sorted  for  each  measure  such  that  a  lower  number  indicates  greater
liberality.46
Data  appendix,  table  A.5:  Price  distortion  and  variability  measures,  from
Dollar  (1990).
LDCs  Price  distortion  Variability
Sri  Lanka  51.000  0.140
Hong  Kong  64.000  0.160
Bangladesh  70.000  0.110
Mexico  71.000  0.120
Nepal  73.000  0.130
Thailand  75.000  0.070
Pakistan  77.000  0.090
Syrian  Arab  Rep.  78.000  0.170
Malta  79.000  0.040
Colombia  81.000  0.070
Peru  83.000  0.130
Singapore  87.000  0.100
Malaysia  88.000  0.080
Costa  Rica  91.000  0.170
Philippines  92.000  0.130
Portugal  92.000  0.090
Cyprus  92.000  0.100
Uruguay  92.000  0.170
Fiji  93.000  0.100
India  94.000  0.130
Trinidad  & Tobago  96.000  0.220
Brazil  97.000  0.130
Indonesia  98.000  0.150
Turkey  99.000  0.130
Chile  100.000  0.110
Iran  102.000  0.190
Nicaragua  103.000  0.410
Tunisia  104.000  0.110
Papua  New  Guinea  105.000  0.090
Venezuela  109.000  0.230
Guatemala  109.000  0.270
Korea  110.000  0.040
Barbados  110.000  0.130
Argentina  113.000  0.230
Ecuador  113.000  0.190
Haiti  114.000  0.270
Jordan  116.000  0.070
Malawi  116.000  0.150
Guyana  117.000  0.350
Madagascar  120.000  0.080
Morocco  123.000  0.110
Lesotho  126.000  0.150
Suriname  126.000  0.130
Benin  126.000  0.080
Mali  127.000  0.090
Dominican  Republic  129.000  0.190
Oman  129.000  0.210
Burkina  Paso  130.000  0.060
Data  appendix,  table  A.5:  Price  distortion  and variability  measures,  from47
Dollar (1990) (continued).
LDCs (cont.l  Price distortion  Variability
Yemen  131.000  0.200
Kenya  131.000  0.040
El Salvador  132.000  0.440
Jamaica  139.000  0.190
Paraguay  141.000  0.210
Togo  141.000  0.040
Senegal  146.000  0.090
Gambia, The  150.000  0.080
Uganda  155.000  0.500
Central African Rep.  156.000  0.090
Sudan  163.000  0.160
Zimbabwe  164.000  0.060
Rwanda  165.000  0.240
Burundi  167.000  0.200
Egypt  168.000  0.270
Angola  172.000  0.270
Bolivia  181.000  0.460
Ivory Coast  185.000  0.060
Cameroon  187.000  0.060
Algeria  190.000  0.110
Guinea  190.000  0.190
Congo  191.000  0.080
Sierra Leone  201.000  0.250
Zaire  201.000  0.220
Niger  204.000  0.050
Zambia  206.000  0.120
Tanzania-  216.000  0.170
Ghana  248.000  0.280
Nigeria  277.000  0.310
Industrial market
Canada  83.000  0.080
United States  90.000  0.060
Italy  92.000  0.060
France  98.000  0.113
United Kingdom  99.000  0.110
Belgium  100.000  0.190
New Zealand  101.000  0.070
Netherlands, The  105.000  0.130
Norway  107.000  0.110
Germany, Fed. Rep.  109.000  0.150
Denmark  112.000  0.150
Japan  118.000  0.098
Ireland  119.000  0.050
Finland  126.000  0.080
Switzerland  127.000  0.100
Australia  129.000  0.050
Sweden  142.000  0.14048
Appendix  1:  Trade  intensity  regression  results
Overall  trade
VaLid  cases:  93  Dependent  variable:  X4M/GDP
Missing  cases:  0  Deletion  method:  Mone
Total  SS:  119023.279  Degrees  of freedom:  85
R-squared:  0.344  Rbar-squared:  0.290
Residual  SS:  78079.607  Std  error  of  eat:  30.308
F(7,85):  6.368  Probability  of  F:  0.000
Durbin-Watson:  2.028
Standard  Prob  Standardized  Cor  with
Variable  Estimate  Error  t-value  aItl  Estimate  Dep Var
.......  ............  ...  .....  . ......  .........  ...  ...................
const  -9.626735  48.941007  -0.196701  0.845  ...  ...
Pop'l  -0.000037  0.000040  -0.941007  0.349  -0.089686  -0.238123
Area  -0.005056  0.001905  -2.654625  0.009  -0.259662  -0.264237
CIF/FOB  34.774436  40.710779  0.854183  0.395  0.088169  -0.071063
oil  exp.  -17.103676  9.005648  -1.899217  0.061  -0.184784  -0.012559
ind  mkt  -34.893366  13.165815  -2.650301  0.010  -0.376979  0.090860
GDPpcap  0.013885  0.003512  3.952972  0.000  1.493805  0.337832
GDPpc"2  -0.000001  0.000000  -2.277301  0.025  -0.791447  0.268407
Manufacturing
Valid  cases:  93  Dependent  variable:  X+NM/DP
Missing  cases:  0  Deletion  method:  None
Total  SS:  44585.134  Degrees  of freedom:  85
R-squared:  0.448  Rbar-squared:  0.403
Residual  SS:  24595.228  Std error  of est:  17.010
F(7,85):  9.869  Probability  of F:  0.000
Durbin-Watson:  1.788
Standard  Prob  Standardized  Cor  with
Variable  Estimate  Error  t-value  >|tI  Estimate  Dep Var
..  . .....  ...........................................  ............  ..........
const  -4.372820  27.468157  -0.159196  0.874  ...  ...
.3p'L  -0.000010  0.000022  -0.466919  0.642  -0.040809  -0.187147
Area  -0.003091  0.001069  -2.891667  0.005  -0.259376  -0.215885
CIF/FOB  12.934160  22.848939  0.566073  0573  0.053582  -0.168468
oiL  exp.  -17.930357  5.054423  -3.547459  0.001  -0.316507  -0.143371
ind  mkt  -17.829487  7.389318  -2.412873  0.018  -0.314727  0.239050
GDPpcap  0.009935  0.001971  5.039561  0.000  1.746387  0.440099
GDPpcA2  -0.000000  0.000000  -3.095470  0.003  -0.986519  0.34969349
Agriculture
Valid  cases:  93  Dependent  variable:  X+H/GDP
Missing  cases:  0  DeLetion method:  None
Total  SS:  5379.476  Degrees of  freedom:  85
R-squared:  0.270  Rbar-squared:  0.209
Residual SS:  3929.705  Std error  of  est:  6.799
F(7,85):  4.480  Probability  of  F:  0.000
Durbin-Watson:  2.094
Standard  Prob  Standardized  Cor with
Variable  Estimate  Error  t-value  >Itl  Estimate  Dep  Var
.......  .....  ...........  ......................................  ..............  ..............................  ..........
const  *3.052778  10.979538  -0.278043  0.782  ---  ...
Pop'L  -0.000017  0.000009  -1.916292  0.059  -0.192730  -0.279977
Area  -0.000726  0.000427  -1.699823  0.093  *0.175455  -0.284209
CIF/FOB  14.005767  9.133149  1.533509  0.129  0.167036  0.227620
oil  exp.  -6.694073  2.020348  -3.313328  0.001  -0.340181  -0.330715
ind  ,iakt  -1.579579  2.953649  -0.534789  0.594  -0.080271  -0.125971
GDPpcap  0.000733  0.000788  0.930473  0.355  0.371049  -0.195024
GDPpc'2  -0.000000  0.000000  -0.986000  0.327  *0.361606  -0.214052
Resources
Valid cases:  93  Dependent  variable:  X+M/GDP
Missing cases:  0  Deletion method:  None
Total SS:  19226.018  Degrees  of freedom:  85
R-squared:  0.294  Rbar-squared:  0.236
Residual SS:  13568.731  Std error  of  est:  12.635
F(7,85):  5.063  Probability  of  F:  0.000
Durbin-Watson:  2.174
Standard  Prob  Standardized  Cor with
Variable  Estimate  Error  t-value  >ItI  Estimate  Dep Var
const  -2.710863  20.402045  -0.132872  0.895  ...  ---
Pop'l  -0.000009  0.000017  -0.547701  0.585  -0.054144  -0.147106
Area  -0.001146  0.000794  -1.442879  0.153  -0.146388  -0.166933
CIF/FOB  7.821677  16.971109  0.460882  0.646  0.049343  -0.031690
oil  exp.  8.724629  3.754186  2.323974  0.023  0.234527  0.383038
ind mkt  -14.506988  5.488435  -2.643192  0.010  -0.389962  -0.081075
GDPpcap  0.002836  0.001464  1.936523  0.056  0.759041  0.254242
GDPPcA2  -0.000000  0.000000  -0.603518  0.548  -0.217552  0.23449850
Appendix 2:  ImPort Penetration  regression  results.
Full  sanpte,  Levels,  Total  imports.
VaLid cases:  72  Dependent  variabLe:  Import  pen.
Missing  cases:  0  Deletion  method:  None
Total  SS:  49328.162  Degrees of  freedom:  63
R-squared:  0.387  Rbar-squared:  0.310
Residual  SS:  30216.635  Std  error  of  est:  21.900
F(8,63):  4.981  ProbabiLity  of  F:  0.000
Standard  Prob  Standardized  Cor with
Variable  Estimate  Error  t-value  ,|t|  Estimate  Dep  Var
const  31.178001  8.339815  3.738453  0.000  ---
NTB  cvge  0.043113  0.085908  0.501849  0.618  0.058061  -0.222703
Trfs  -0.349818  0.177352 -1.972450  0.053  -0.290207  -0.365348
Pop'l  0.042572  0.038267  1.112482  0.270  0.150722  -0.196547
Area  -4.639556  2.536318  -1.829249  0.072  -0.210459  -0.320272
CIF/FOB  0.091081  2.466081  0.036934  0.971  0.003663  -0.020303
GDPpcap  0.956995  0.213665  4.478948  0.000  1.373635  0.274897
GDPpCA  2  -44.981779  11.134051  -4.040019  0.000  -1.118418  0.117915
oil  exp.  -17.467279  7.118460  -2.453800  0.017  -0.2S8965  -0.037736
Full  sanpte,  levels,  Manufacturing  imports
Valid  cases:  72  Dependent  variable:  Import  pen.
Missing cases:  0  Deletion  method:  No1.
Total  SS:  14599.080  Degrees of  freedom:  63
R-squared:  0.362  Rbar-squared:  0.281
Residual SS:  9310.857  Std  error  of  est:  12.157
F(8,63):  4.473  Probability  of  F:  0.000
Standard  Prob  Standardized  Cor with
Variable  Estimate  Error  t-vaLue  >ItI  Estimate  Dep  Var
const  19.372813  4.506817  4.298557  0.000  --  ---
NTB  cvge  0.030141  0.045081  0.668607  0.506  0.077687  -0.191125
Trfs  -0.174812  0.093454  -1.870567  0.066  -0.284108  -0.380834
Pop'l  0.017830  0.021468  0.830568  0.409  0.116038  -0.225978
Area  -2.572742  1.409727  -1.824993  0.073  -0.214522  -0.337101
CIF/FOB  -0.329361  1.371796  -0.240095  0.811  -0.024349  -0.048839
GDPpoap  0.476050  0.117868  4.038848  0.000  1.256028  0.296639
GDPpc^2  -21.525730  6.178217  -3.484133  0.001  -0.983807  0.156355
oil  exp.  -8.397505  3.945703  -2.128266  0.037  -0.255361  -0.01109551
Full  samle,  levels,  Agricultural  imports
Valid  cases:  72  Dependent  variable:  Import pen.
Missing  cases:  0  Deletion  method:  None
Total  SS:  1018.712  Degrees  of  freedom:  63
R-squared:  0.234  Rbar-squared:  0.136
Residual SS:  780.836  Std error  of  est:  3.521
F(8,63):  2.399  Probability  of  F:  0.025
Standard  Prob  Standardized  Cor with
Variable  Estimate  Error  t-value  >It|  Estimate  Dep  Var
const  5.252262  1.434132  3.662329  0.001  ...  ...
NTB  cvge  0.002250  0.014253  0.157885  0.875  0.020964  -0.117922
Trfs  -0.036525  0.026287  -1.389466  0.170  -0.211760  -0.308142
Pop't  0.002244  0.005793  0.387308  0.700  0.055273  -0.200013
Area  -0.735217  0.407603  -1.803758  0.076  -0.232075  -0.313654
CIF/FOB  0.086006  0.396688  0.216810  0.829  0.024070  0.026946
G0Ppcap  0.080270  0.035261  2.276429  0.026  0.S01748  0.085438
GDPpc'2  -4.345755  1.796488  -2.419027  0.018  -0.751890  -0.017130
oil  exp.  -1.981227  1.156559  -1.713036  0.092  -0.228074  -0.118219
Full  sample,  levels,  Resource imports.
Valid  cases:  72  Dependent  variable:  Import pen.
Missing  cases:  0  Deletion  method:  None
Total  SS:  8551.231  Degrees  of  freedom:  63
R-squared:  0.302  Rbar-squared:  0.213
ResiduaL SS:  5971.228  Std error  of  est:  9.736
F(8,63).  3.403  Probability  of  F:  0.003
Standard  Prob  Standardized  Cor with
Variable  Estimate  Error  t-vaLue  >It|  Estimate  Dep  Var
const  5.816626  3.074671  1.891788  0.063  ---  ...
NTB  cvge  -0.010107  0.031062  -0.325381  0.746  -0.039048  -0.227097
Trfs  -0.114436  0.076680  -1.492391  0.141  -0.196902  -0.210826
Pop'L  0.018229  0.015761  1.156567  0.252  0.155003  -0.103970
Area  -1.479939  1.099288  -1.346271  0.183  -0.161238  -0.210703
CIF/FOB  0.555572  1.108305  0.501281  0.618  0.053666  0.009480
GDPpcap  0.386865  0.091520  4.227127  0.000  1.333690  0.234948
GDPpc^2  -18.352759  4.881971  -3.759293  0.000  -1.095978  0.081225
oit  exp.  -6.739250  3.133440  -2.150751  0.035  -0.267771  -0.03225952
Apoendix  3:  Resression results  of  trade  intensity  rearessions  with  price  distortion  and varlabilitv
measures
Regression only  on LDCs
Valid  cases:  72  Dependent  variabLe:  TrdShare
Missing  cases:  0  Deletion  method:  None
Total  SS:  46996.251  Degrees of  freedom:  63
R-squared:  0.316  Rbar-squared:  0.229
Residual SS:  32164.110  Std error  of  est:  22.595
F(8,63):  3.631  Probability  of  F:  0.002
Durbin-Uatson:  1.839
Standard  Prob  Standardized  Cor with
Variable  Estimate  Error  t-value  >ItI  Estimate  Dep  Ver
const  41.588648  39.479961  1.053412  0.296
Distortion  0.003527  0.069184  0.050982  0.960  0.006202  -0.187622
Variability-50.974729  29.724495  -1.714906  0.091  -0.187167  -0.203238
pop'l  -0.000017  0.000034  -0.515258  0.608  -0.062854  -0.250998
area  -0.006805  0.002582  -2.635518  0.011  -0.315130  -0.344759
ciffob  3.851348  31.372182  0.122763  0.903  0.014105  -0.029791
GDPpcap  0.012384  0.006255  1.979869  0.052  0.720985  0.327002
GDPpcap2  -0.000001  0.000001  -1.034107  0.305  -0.351155  0.279370
oil  exp  -12.490037  7.964957  -1.568124  0.122  -0.188046  -0.090754
Regression on non-oil  LDCs
VaLid  cases:  59  Dependent  variable:  TrdShare
Missing  cases:  0  Deletion  method:  None
Total  SS:  42850.186  Degrees of  freedom:  51
R-squared:  0.440  Rbar-squared:  0.363
Residual SS:  23996.999  Std  error  of  est:  21.692
F(7,51):  5.724  Probability  of  F:  0.000
Standard  Prob  Standardized  Cor with
Variable  Estimate  Error  t-vaLue  >|t|  Estimate  Dep Var
const  45.928246  40.370718  1.137662  0.261  ---
Distortion  -0.041532  0.079941  -0.519534  0.606  -0.063604  -0.255769
Variability-36.052877  30.196114  -1.193957  0.238  -0.130473  -0.179496
pop'L  -0.000026  0.000033  -0.783834  0.437  -0.096246  -0.234746
area  -0.005441  0.002561  -2.124251  0.039  -0.252341  -0.322810
ciffob  3.897016  31.239426  0.124747  0.901  0.014563  -0.078107
GDPpcap  0.005488  0.007904  0.694311  0.491  0.235057  0.563596
GDPpcap2  0.000001  0.000001  0.919053  0.362  0.290399  0.567842PRE  Working  Pager  Series
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